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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by the respondent for breach
of an employment agreement, whereby respondent al leged tt lat
appellant failed to pay respondent one-third (1/3) of respondent's
/f-»d! 1/ sal ."ii v ii|inii lii s h'ni'inat m n | "iirsiian l h> pai uqraph ±{t)

of

the employment agreement. ^Appellant answered and counterclaimed,
alleging that cause for dismissal was sufficient under

f

r n terms

of the agreement because respondent
dismissal were unethical and constituted
DISPOSITION
This i s an a p p e a l by a p p e l - ^ n

trial court i n favor of the respondent

- .ict n-;<.raL : lrpitude.
COURT
• *. ••

'

• HP judgment of

~ne

^---.- -is heard -v the

Honor a b l e Dav id I t. I K1 e , J ud g e <) l[ 1 h c "H i i r. < i «I ud I c i, a I Di s 1.1; i. ei
of S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of U t a h .

STATEMENT

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

What is the standard of conduct which constitutes
unethical conduct and moral turpitude, and whether the trial court
erred i i I i lot c • 7 i nq cippel Ian I. I" s mot: ion loi .j m„ *i t r i a l .
Appellant seeks a determination reversing the decision of
the lower court, finding that respondent was discharged for cause
and that the acts or t.ne respondent which had led lo Ins dismissal
were unethical and constituted an act of mora

turvitua*-.

tl: le alternative that I lie ii i.ni c o m I " s Fimli
Conclusions of Law were erroneous and that appellant is entitled
to a new trial.

"C"« :> ur t

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 5, 1980, appellant and respondent entered
into an employment agreement.

(R. 68)

Under the terms of the

employment agreement, the respondent was to act as club manager
and perform certain designated services.

Paragraph 1(f) of the

employment agreement sets forth the conditions by which the
appellant could terminate respondent's employment:
If, in the judgment of the board of directors of
the employer [Willow Creek Country Club], the
manager [plaintiff] fails to perform any of his
obligations or duties hereunder, and the board
of directors determines that the conduct of the
manager is unethical, involves gross negligence
or a breach of moral turpitude, this contract
shall terminate at the option of the employer
upon thirty (30) days notice to the manager. In
the event, however, the employer shall wish to
terminate this contract without sufficient cause
or reason, employer shall pay manager one-third
(1/3) of one year's salary as liquidated damages
(emphasis added).
On January 23, 1983, pursuant to the recommendations of
appellant's board of director's, respondent's employment was
terminated.

(R. 68)

Appellant, in terminating respondent's

employment, claimed that certain actions by the respondent were
unethical and involved acts of moral turpitude.
1.

These acts were:

Respondent issued salary checks to appellant's

employees from which checks respondent did not deduct federal and
state taxes and FICA;
2.

Respondent issued salary checks to individuals for

services rendered who were not employed by appellant;

-2-

3.

Respondent issued salary checks to one of appellant's

employees [Frank Rotunno], which check allegedly compensated that
employee for living expenses and travel expenses without consideration to the appellant;
4.

Respondent issued bonus checks to two (2) employees

and required those employees to pay him some amount from those
bonus checks as a cash kick-back;
5.

Respondent received services at his personal

residence from two (2) of appellant's maintenance workers when
these employees were on duty for appellant, and for which
appellant received no compensation.

(R. 13)

Based on each of these allegations, appellant contended
that it had sufficient cause to terminate the respondent's
employment pursuant to paragraph 1(f) of the employment agreement.
Subsequent to trialf the court ruled that none of
respondent's actions were acts which amounted to gross negligence,
unethical conduct or acts of moral turpitude.

The court found

that appellant breached its employment agreement with respondent
in that it terminated respondent without cause and failed to pay
respondent one-third (1/3) of his annual salary as liquidated
damages.

(R. 108-109)
The trial court thus determined that the respondent had

been damaged in the amount of $13f800, plus interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum from January 23, 1983 to the date of
judgment, and attorney fees and court costs incurred in enforcing
-3-

the employment agreement,

(R. Ill)

The appellant objected to the original judgment rendered
by the trial court for the reason that the court failed to make
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Counsel for respondent

thereafter submitted prepared Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law,

(R. 98-100)
Appellant objected to Finding of Fact No. 17 for the

reason that respondentf in his answer to appellant's counterclaim,
admitted that he received funds from a bonus given to Donna
Hagblom, an employee of Willow Creek Country Club.

At the trial,

respondent denied that he received any funds from Donna Hagblom in
any amount and stated in direct examination that he received no
kickback funds from Donna Hagblom.

(R. 268-269)

Donna Hagblom

testified unequivocably that respondent stated on two occasions
that he would give her a bonus if she would return part of it to
him in cash and keep quiet about it.

(R. 235-236)

The appellant

also objected to Conclusions of Law Nos. 3, 5, 6 and 7 upon the
grounds that the Court should have concluded that the admitted
receipt of a kickback from Donna Hagblom on two occasions was a
payment to the respondent of an unauthorized bonus which amounted
to embezzlement of appellant's funds.

(R. 99)

The appellant further objected and argued that the court
should have concluded that accepting services from appellant's
employees while on duty was a theft of services under
§76-6-409(2), Utah Code Annotated.
-4-

(R. 99)

Appellant objected to Conclusion of Law No. 3 for the
reason that the actions of respondent constituted unethical
conduct or acts involving moral turpitude.

Appellant asserted

that the findings of the trial court that appellant was entitled
to setoff against the judgment constituted a recognition that
respondent received services from appellant's employees without
compensating appellant.

(R. 99-100)

Theft of services over $100

is a Class A misdemeanor and theft of funds in excess of $250 is a
third degree felony. See §76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated.
The trial court on April 10, 1985, entered an amended
judgment entitling respondent to the sum of $13,800, together with
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the
date of judgment, and entitling the respondent to the costs of the
action in the amount of $41.50 and attorney fees in the amount of
$3,500.

Further, the trial court in its Order awarded appellant

an offset of $105 against the above judgment for personal services
rendered for respondent by employees of appellant while on company
time.

On May 24, 1985, the trial court entered an order denying

appellant's motion for a new trial and rejecting appellant's
objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The court

ordered that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were to
remain as entered on April 10, 1985.

(R. 110-111)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent's receipt of unauthorized kickbacks and
services constituted acts of moral turpitude and unethical conduct
-5-

and therefore, under the terms of the employment agreement entered
into between appellant and respondent, respondent was properly
discharged from his employment.

The trial court erred in not

granting appellant's motion for a new trial in that the evidence
did preponderate to appellant's benefit, showing that respondent
did request and did receive unauthorized kickbacks and services
from appellant's employees.

The trial court found that the

appellant was entitled to an offset of $105 against the judgment
amount entered based upon respondent's receipt of services from
employees of appellant, while these employees were on duty for
appellant.

This in itself would constitute theft of services

pursuant to §76-6-409(2), Utah Code Annotated, which must be
considered as unethical conduct on the part of respondent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RECEIPT OP UNAUTHORIZED "KICKBACKS" AND SERVICES BY
RESPONDENT CONSTITUTES ACTS OF MORAL TURPITUDE
A.

The Receipt of Unauthorized Kickbacks from Employee

Donna Hagblom Constitutes Acts of Moral Turpitude.
In her testimony before the court, Donna Hagblom was
questioned as to whether she was required to return to the
respondent certain portions of two checks written on the account
of appellant in the amounts of $300 and $419.85 advanced to her as
a "bonus". Mrs. Hagblom testified as follows:
Question: How did the [opportunity to receive
the bonus] come about?
-6-

Answer: ...I know Mr. Rotunno and Mr. Aarts
were downstairs having lunch and they called me
over there.
Question: When you say "downstairs having
lunch," where was that? At the club?
Answer: At the Willow Creek Country Club in the
Willow Room.
Question:

Okay.

Go on.

Answer: And they called me over and said there
was some money in the gratuity fund and they
were going to give me a check and I was to give
part of it back to Mr. Aarts. (R. 232-233)
***

Question: Exhibit 6 contains a check for $300
written to Donna Hagblom. Is that the $300 that
you are —
Answer:

Yes it is.

Question:
Answer:

—

describing for the court?

Yes.

Question: What specifically did they ask you to
do with respect to the money?
Answer:

To give half of it back to Mr. Aarts.

Question:
Answer:

Yes.

Question:
time?
Answer:

In cash?
Uh huh.

And did you question them at that

No, I didnft.

Question: What did you in fact do when you
received the $300 check?
Answer:
Aarts.
Question:

I cashed it, and I gave $150 to Mr.
Where did this transaction take
-7-

place?
Answer: It was in his office, and I went in and
put it on his desk. (R. 233)
The witness Mrs. Hagblom further testified that the
respondent and herself had a conversation in the respondent's
office where he told her he would give her a check out of the
gratuity fund for a certain amount of money if she would give him
all but $100 of it back.

At trial, the witness testified as

follows:
Question: Mrs. Hagblom, I call your attention to
December, 198 2. Did you have an opportunity to
receive a bonus in December, 1982?
Answer:

Yes, I did.

Question: I call your attention to Exhibit 6
again, the face fly leaf you described on that
exhibit has an amount of $450 [$419.85 after
taxes] and the initials of Mr. Aarts. Do you
recall a meeting you had with Mr. Aarts
concerning this authorization?
Answer:

Yes, I do.

Question:
Answer:

In his office.

Question:
Answer:

Where did that meeting take place?

And who was present?

Just Mr. Aarts and myself.

Question: And do you remember how that meeting
came about?
Answer: Well, he just called me in and told me
he was going — if he gave me a check out of the
gratuity fund for this amount of money if I would
give him all but a hundred dollars of it back.
Question: Did you question him as to why he
wanted you to do that?
-8-

Answer: No —
question him.

he was my superior.

I didn't

Question: Did he suggest to you anything about
keeping the matter confidential?
Answer: Yes. He said "Don't say anything to
anybody." Of course I said I wouldn't, but I
did. (R. 235-236)
***

Question: [Mr. Haslam] Now, after you received
the check, what did you do after that? I'm
talking about the $419.85 check.
Answer:

I went down to the bank and cashed it.

Question:
Aarts?
Answer:

And did you return the funds to Mr.
All but $100 of it.

Question:
$419.85?
Answer:

So you gave Mr. Aarts $300 of the

Right.

Question: Now, after that transaction had taken
place, did you have an occasion to have a
conversation with any other person at Willow
Creek Country Club about the transaction?
Answer: Yes, I did. It was about a week or so
later and Annie Laurie [Baker, a Willow Creek
employee] was coming out of the ladies restroom
and she was really upset and was feeling very
bad. And I said, "I know how you feel. I don't
feel right about it, but please don't say
anything about it to anybody." (R. 236-237)
At trial, Annie Laurie Baker testified that she had
spoken with the witness Donna Hagblom about the fact that Mrs.
Hagblom had received several bonuses from Mr. Aarts and had been
asked to return part of the bonus to Mr. Aarts.
-9-

At trial she

testified:
[Annie Laurie Baker]: We were talking about the
fact that she [Donna Hagblom] had received
several bonuses from Mr, Aarts and had been
asked to return part of the bonus to Mr. Aarts.
The Court: Okay.
Question: [Mr. Haslam] Okay. After you had
that conversation with Donna Hagblom, what
happened after that Mrs. Baker?
Answer: Well, that was a Friday afternoon. And
Monday morning I repeated the conversation to
Chell [a Willow Creek Country Club employee],
and Chell called Byron Watts [at that time
president of Willow Creek Country Club]. Byron
Watts called Bert Bruns [a member of the Board
of Directors of Willow Creek Country Club at
that time], and Bert Bruns came out and talked
to both Chell and me. And the very next day I
knew they had fired Mr. Aarts. (R. 205-206)
Testimony at trial was clear that the respondent could
not share in bonuses paid from the appellant's gratuity fund.
Testifying before the trial court, Annie Laurie Baker testified:
Question: [Mr. Haslam]
Now, who had the
discretion to — to give bonuses at Willow
Creek Country Club while you were working
there?
Answer:

Mr. Aarts.

Question: And did Mr. Aarts as manager share
in those gratuities?
Answer:

No, he did not.

Question: Those are just specifically for the
employees?
Answer:

Uh huh.

(R. 211-212)

The record demonstrates conclusively that respondent did
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in fact receive unauthorized kickbacks from bonuses paid to the
witness Donna Hagblom from a Willow Creek Country Club account,
and these kickbacks precipitated respondent's termination.
The respondent, in response to the allegations set forth
in paragraph 4 of appellant's counterclaim (R. 14)/ admitted that
employee Donna Hagblom was paid a bonus of $419.85/ and further
admitted that iMrs. Hagblom returned some of that to respondent/
but alleged that she did so of her own accord.
In defining the term "moral turpitude"/ the courts have
determined as follows:
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness/ vileness
or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellow man, or to
society in general/ contrary to the accepted and
customary rules of right and duty between man
and man. It appears from the authorities to the
rule without exception/ that the offense of
obtaining money from another by fraud or false
pretenses/ or larceny after trust/ or crimes
malum in sef involve moral turpitude.
Huff v. Anderson/ 90 S.E.2df 329 (Ga. 1955).
The testimony is clear and convincing that the activity
engaged in by the respondent with respect to receipt of the funds
from Donna Hagblomf in and of itself constituted acts of moral
turpitude.

The board of directors of appellant concluded that

respondent breached a duty owed to appellant/ and thereafter
terminated respondent pursuant to paragraph 1(f) of the employment
agreement.

(R. 222)

The question of whether certain actions constitute acts
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of moral turpitude is a question of law to be determined from the
record on appeal.
1943).

See In Re Pearce, 136 P.2d 969f 970 (Utah

The Utah Supreme Court has held that moral turpitude is

anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty or good
morals.

Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself,

regardless of its being punishable by law.

Moral turpitude is

adaptive; it is determined by the state of the public morals and
the common sense of the community.
9 71-972.

See In Re Pearce, supra, pp.

In Re Pearce approved each one of these definitions in

and of themselves as adequate to constitute moral turpitude.
Certainly the respondent's actions were contrary to the
duties he owed the appellant, and on this basis alone, the court
should have determined that the actions of respondent involved
moral turpitude.
B.

Respondent Wrongfully Deprived Appellant Of

Employee's Services.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court
determined as follows:

"During the course of plaintiff's employ-

ment with defendant, and in response to plaintiff's request, Kevin
Stewart, a maintenance man employed by the defendant, cleaned
plaintiff's house on several occasions, working a total of twelve
hours.

Plaintiff paid Stewart occasionally for these services,

which Stewart provided while he was on duty at the Willow Creek
Country Club."

(R. 105-106)

(Emphasis added)

During respondent's course of employment with appellant,
-12-

and in response to respondent's request/ Steve Draper [a
maintenance man employed by appellant], serviced respondent's
evaporative [swamp] cooler for approximately two hours while he
was on duty for appellant,

(R. 106)

Paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law provides that
"plaintiff must reimburse defendant for the services of its
maintenance menf for a total of fourteen hours at $5.00 per hourf
plus $35 for transportation costsf or a total offset of $105."
(R. 108)
The trial court recognized that the respondent wrongfully
appropriated the services of appellant's maintenance men.

This

amounts to a theft of services/ proscribed by §76-6-409(2)/ Utah
Code Annotated/ which states:
(2) A person commits theft iff having control
over the disposition of services of another/ to
which he knows he is not entitled/ he diverts
such services to his own benefit or to the
benefit of another who he knows is not entitled
thereto.
Theft of services of $100 is a Class A misdemeanor/ and
theft of funds in excess of $250 is a third degree felony.
§76-6-412/ Utah Code Annotated.

As noted in In Re Pearcey 136

P.2d 969/ 970 (Utah 1943)/ the actual conviction of a crime in and
of itself does not determine whether an act constitutes moral
turpitude.

Generally crimes "malum in se" involve moral turpitude.

See In Re Pearcey supra.

"Malum in se" is defined as a wrong in

itself; an act or case involving illegality from the very nature
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of the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral, and public
law.

An act is said to be "malum in se" when it is inherently and

essentially evil, that is, immoral in its nature and injurious in
its consequences, without any regard to the fact of its being
noticed or punished by the law of the State.

See Black's Law

Dictionary 5th Ed. p. 865 (1978).
In committing an act which is "malum in se", the person
is presumed to intend an actual consequences of his act, and
general criminal intent with which an act is done may be inferred
from the words and conduct of the actor.

See Peck v. Dunn, 574

P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1978).
POINT II
THE TRIAL CODRT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
In its Findings of Fact the trial court found that "At
the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the defendant withdrew
the following claims for damages that it made in its counterclaim:
(a)

$1,900 in living expenses and travel expenses paid

to Frank Rotunno;
(b)

$300 of Frank Rotunno1s bonus which appellant

alleged respondent forced Rotunno to return to him in cash; and
(c)

$300 of Donna Hagblom's $419.85 bonus, and $150 of

her $300 bonus, which appellant alleged respondent forced her to
return to him in cash.

(R. 105)

Subsection (c) of the trial court's Findings of Fact in
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paragraph 10 is without basis*

The transcript clearly demon-

strates that counsel for appellant specifically reserved its claim
regarding the claim for damages respecting respondent's
instructions to the witness Donna Hagblom to return a substantial
portion of the bonus taken from Willow Creek funds.

The

transcript reads as follows:
Mr. Haslam: I will withdraw the counterclaim as
far as Mr. Rotunno is concerned, but if your
Honor finds these violations with respect to the
services performed to the Club — pardon me,
from Mr. Aarts by the Club maintenance men, I
think we should have a judgment for the value of
those services and also the money that was
turned back, the club money that was turned
back, from Mrs. Hagblom and Mr. Rotunno, and
that in accordance with the evidence, there was
a transfer of that. But there is surely $300
which was returned by Mrs. Hagblom and $150 paid
by Mrs. Hagblom.... (R. 279-280)
Appellant objected to the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, citing Mrs. Hagblom1s testimony that she would
receive a "bonus" if she would return $300 to Mr. Aarts.

(R«, 99)

Where the trial court has denied the motion for a new
trial, the trial court's denial will be reversed if "the evidence
to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and
unjust."

Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982);

Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Company, 27 Utah 2d 430, 497
P.2d 236 (1972).
As set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the court in making its ruling did not take into account the
-15-

claims of the witness Donna Hagblom, mistakenly believing that
these claims had been withdrawn.

Since the trial court did not

take the claim under consideration, there is considerable prejudicial effect on the outcome of this case.

One of appellant's

major assertions is that respondent's actions in taking
appellant's money to award a "bonus" to an employee in order to
receive a kickback from that employee, constituted an act of moral
turpitude and unethical conduct, which would support the termination for cause as set out in paragraph 1(f) of the employment
agreement.
The trial court also found that the evidence presented at
trial did not preponderate to appellant's benefit that Mrs.
Hagblom was required by respondent to return $150 of her $300
bonus and $300 of her $419.85 bonus in cash to plaintiff.

As has

been shown, the testimony of Donna Hagblom and Annie Laurie Baker
is uncontroverted that the respondent did request these actions on
the part of Mrs. Hagblom.

Nelson v. Trujillo is controlling in

reversing the trial court's decision because the evidence to
support the respondent's claim is on its face not convincing.
The appellant is entitled to have the trial court review
the evidence regarding unauthorized kickbacks received by the
respondent from Donna Hagblom and thereby determine whether this
receipt of funds would constitute unethical conduct or an act of
moral turpitude.

If so, this would justify respondent's termin-

ation pursuant to the language of paragraph 1(f)
-16-

of the employ-

ment agreement.
The failure of the trial court to review these aspects of
the case serves to make the verdict "plainly unreasonable and
unjust" as set forth in Nelson v. Trujillo, supra,
POINT III
THE ACTS OF RESPONDENT CONSTITUTE UNETHICAL CONDUCT
Black1s Law Dictionary defines unethical as "not
ethical; hence colloquiallyf not according to business or professional standards,"

Black's Law Dictionary 1698 (Rev. 4th Ed.

1968).
The findings of the trial court that appellant is
entitled to an offset of $105 conclusively demonstrates that the
conduct of the respondent did not conform to professional
standards.

Fraudulent actions by the employee in his relationship

with third persons will justify his discharge in case such conduct
also affects the value of the performance that is due the employer.
See Conwayy Inc. v. Ross, 627 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Alaska 1981).

An

employee owes a duty to his employer to conduct himself in a
manner which benefits his employer.

See Chiodo v. General

Waterworks Corp. , 17 Utah 2d 425; 413 P.2d 891, 892 (1966).
The trial court made a determination for an amount of
offset on the judgment based upon hours worked by the employees of
appellant.

The court made a distinction between work performed at

the respondent's residence which benefited the respondent (i.e.,
snow shoveling done while employee was on duty for appellant so
-17-

respondent could get to work) (R. 106) f and the work done for the
direct benefit of the respondent with no benefit whatsoever to
appellant (i.e., cleaning respondents house on several occasions
and servicing respondents evaporative swamp cooler).
105-106)

(R.

As noted in Point 1(B), findings of the trial court in

this instance would subject the respondent to criminal sanctions
for theft of services.

By no stretch of the imagination can it be

assumed that an employee engaged in criminal activity to the
detriment of his employer would be acting "ethically".
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, appellant requests this Court
reverse the decision of the trial court, finding that discharge of
respondent was justifiable and the acts of respondent which led to
his discharge were unethical and constituted moral turpitude.

In

the alternative, the appellant seeks a determination that the
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were in
error and that appellant is entitled to a new trial.
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this 26th day of September, 1985.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH

ROy G. HASLAM
Attorney for Appellant
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Thomas R. Grisley, being duly sworn, says:
That he is employed in the office of Biele, Haslam &
Hatch, attorneys for appellant, Willow Creek Country Club.
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of
appellant's Brief upon the parties to the within described action
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Jeffrey R. Oritt
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys for Respondent
Third Floor MONY Plaza
424 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first
class, postage prepaid, on the 26th day of September, 1985.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of
September, 1985.

• Wi Lco^y
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires:
11/6/88
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ADDENDDM
Employment Agreement
Letter dated December 22, 1982 from Kenneth R. Chidester,
President of Willow Creek Country Club to Jerry W, Aarts
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Amended Judgment
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
In consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions herein
contained, WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY CLUB, a non-profit corporation of the State
of Utah, hereinafter referred to as "Employer11, and JERRY W. AARTS, hereinafter
referred to as "Mancger", hereby covenant and agree as follows:
1,

Employer hereby agrees to employ Jerry W # Aarts as the manager

of its club facilities at Sandy City, Salt Lake County, Utah, for an Indeterminate
term, comn.cncing April 1, 1980, and continuing thereafter, and the Manager
ayrees thereto, subject to the following terms:
a.

Manager shall serve as "Club Manager" of Willow

Creek Country Club, and shall be responsible for the maintenance*
of the main clubhouse facilities, Including the pool area, and
adjacent areas thereto, and shall devote his full time and capabilities to the welfare of the Club and the described facilities
•within the framework of directives promulgated by the Board of
Directors, consistent with the clubhouse rules and By-Laws of
Willow Creek Country Club, Manager shall be directly accountable
and responsible to the Board of Directors and officers of the said
Club.
b.

Manager shall attend all Board Meetings as the Board

may direct and meetings of the House Committee as the Chairman
of the House Committee may direct, and shall render such advice
and assistance and submit such reports as may be requested at
any time and from time to time,
c.

Manager shall have the exclusive authority of his area

of responsibility as defined hereinabove, and shall have authority
to employ and discharge the necessary personnel, including maintenance
personnel employed In his area of responsibility as he shall determine
to be necessary for the best Interests of the Club.

6

d.

Manager shall use all reasonable efforts to enforce

clubhouse rules and regulations, and shall bring to the attention
of the Board of Directors any violation of uses or privileges or
of unbecoming conduct on the part of club members.
e.

Enrployer shall provide Manager with a bond under the

blanket bond coverage for other employees.

The amount of said

bond is to be determined by the Board of Directors, such bond
to cov/er the handling and accounting of all monies coming Into
Manager's hands in connection with his duties as "Club Manager11.
f.

If, at any time during the term of this Contract,

Manager is unable to discharge any substantial portion of his
responsibilities hereunder, due to Illness or disability, either*
physical or mental, this contract shall terminate at the option
of employer upon thirty days notice to the employee,

if, In the

judgment of the Board of Directors of Employer, Manager falls to
perform any of his obligations or duties hereunder, and the Board
of Directors determines that the conduct of the Manager Is unethical,
involves gross negligence or a breach of moral turpitude, this Contract
shall terminate at the option of the Employer upon thirty (30} days
notice to the Manager.

In the event, however, the Employer shall

wish to terminate this Contract without sufficient cause or reason,
Employer shall pay Manager one-third (1/3) of one year's salary as
1Iquidated damages.
g.

During the term of this Agreement, Employee shall pay to

Manager a yearly salary of $36,000.00, from which shall be deducted
all Federal and State Withholdlng Tax.

In addition, Employer shall

lease and provide for Manager an automobile, providing for maintenance
and insurance, which shall approximate an additional $4,000*00 per

^

year and shall provide an additional $65*00 per month for the payment
of health and medical Insurance for the use and benefit of Manager*
All payments due hereunder shall be paid monthly*
«-2-

h. Manager shall have the right to participate In activities
and obtain memberships In the State and National organizations which
may be applicable to club managers; the expense of which shall be
paid by Employer.
i. Manager shall receive two (2) weeks vacation per calendar
year v.hich shall be taken by Manager during the slack season of
each year, and the time provtded for Manager to attend any National
Organization applicable to "club managers", local or national, shall
not be deducted from Manager's regular vacation benefits. All such
vacation shall be taken In accordance wlth the Employer's vacation
policy as determined by Its Board of Directors,
2. The parties to this agreement hereby agree that on or befor*
January 15, of each calendar year, the Board of Directors of the Employer and
the "Manager" will review the performance and the salary and benefits paid to
the Manager and the salary and benefits shall be renegotiated annually on said
anniversary date by the parties durtng the life of this agreement.
3*

In the event of default by either party to this agreement,

the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses. Including a reasonable
attorney's fee incurred In enforcing Its terms or In recovering damage for
its breach.
4. This agreement sets forth the entire agreement between Employer
and Manager with respect to the subject matter hereof9 and this Agreement may be
modified only by an Instrument In writing^executed by the parties hereto*
DATED this _ 5 q a y of

^ ^ >

JT~

, 1380.

WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY CLUB

^^Z&JZBIts President
ATTEST

secretary

'

/

/

/

22 December 198 2

Mr. Jerry W. Aarts
9448 Fox Drive Circle
Sandy, Utah 84070
Re:

Willow Creek Country Club

Dear Mr. Aarts,
Reference is made to your Employment Agreement with Willow
Creek Country Club wherein you-are now acting as Manager. It
has come to the attention of the Board of Directors that you
have been- engaged in activities which are detrimental to the
club and which violate the terms and conditions of the contract
as are described in paragraph 1 (f) .
The Board of Directors hereby gives you notice that your
employment as Manager of Willow Creek Country Club shall be
terminated as of the 23rd day of January, 1983.
It is the desire of the Board of Directors that you immediately
vacate the premises of Willow Creek Country Club and provide no
further services during the thirty (30) days notice period. Upon
completion of an audit, you will be paid your final monthly salary
to the date of termination.
Very truly yours,
Willow Creek Country Club

Kenneth R. Chidester
Prssident
KRC/ccb

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY AARTS,

-

:

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY CLUB,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

:
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
:
:

Civil No. C83-2383
(Judge David B. Dee)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before this Court, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding, on
March 20, 1985 at

10:00

a.m.

Plaintiff

was

represented

Jeffrey Oritt; defendant was represented by Roy G. Haslam.

by
The

Court, having read all pleadings and memoranda submitted by the
parties in support of their respective positions, having heard
testimony from witnesses for both sides and having heard argument from counsel, having
being

fully advised

reviewed

all documentary evidence,

in the premises

herein, and good

cause

appearing therefor, hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Jerry Aarts is an individual residing

in the State of New York.

At the time of the evenU pertaining

to this lawsuit, he resided in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

2.

Defendant

Willow Creek

Country

Club

is a not-

for-profit Utah corporation located in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.
3.

On

September

5,

1980, plaintiff

was

hired

by

defendant to be~trfreir club manager.

Pursuant to that hiring,

plaintiff

Employment

and defendant

executed

an

Agreement

in

which the conditions of plaintiff's employment, including the
obligations of both plaintiff and defendant, were outlined.
4.

Defendant

agreed

annual salary of $36,000.

to

pay

plaintiff

an

initial

Effective January 1, 1982, and until

plaintiff was terminated, his annual salary was $41,400.
5.

Defendant terminated plaintiff as its manager on

December 22, 1982.

The effective date of the termination was

January 23, 1983.
6.

The

Employment

Agreement

between

defendant

plaintiff discusses termination for cause at Kl(f).
tion

for cause could

only

and

Termina-

take place because plaintiff had

engaged in conduct that was unethical or involved gross negligence or moral turpitude.
7.

The

Employment

Agreement

requires

defendant

to

pay plaintiff one-third (1/3) of his annual salary at the time
of his termination as liquidated damages if defendant terminates the plaintiff without cause.

8.

After

terminating

plaintiff,

and refused, to pay plaintiff

one-third

defendant

failed,

(1/3) of his annual

salary as liquidated damages.
9.
and

The Employment Agreement provides for court costs

attorney's fees in

the event™" the Agreement

is enforced

through litigation by either plaintiff or defendant.
10.

In its defense of this action, defendant alleged

a number of events that it claims fulfill the "cause" requirement for termination without liability for liquidated damages.
Defendant also filed a Counterclaim.

At the conclusion of the

trial in this matter, defendant withdrew the following claims
for damages that it made in its Counterclaim:
(a)

$1,900

in

living

expenses

and

travel

expenses paid to Frank Rotunno;
(b)

$300 of Frank Rotunno's bonus, which defen-

dant alleged plaintiff forced Rotunno to return to him in cash;
and
(c)
$150

of

her

$300 of Donna Hagblom's $419.85 bonus, and

$300

bonus, which

defendant

alleged

plaintiff

forced her to return to him in cash.
11.
defendant,
Stewart,

a

During the course of plaintiff's employment with
and

in

response

maintenance

man

to

plaintiff's

employed

by

request,

defendant,

Kevin
cleaned

plaintiff's house on several occasions, working a total of 12
hours.

Plaintiff paid Stewart occasionally for these services,

which Stewart provided while he was on duty at the Willow Creek
Country Club.
12.
defendant,

During the course of plaintiff's employment with
and

in

response

to

plaintiff's

request,

Steve

Draper, another maintenance man employed by defendant, plowed
out plaintiff's driveway on one occasion when plaintiff, who
had no snow removal equipment, needed to get to work at Willow
Creek Country Club.

The snow shoveling was done by Draper,

while he was on duty, for the benefit of Willow Creek Country
Club.
13.

During the course of plaintiff's employment with

defendant, and in response to plaintiff's request, Draper serviced

plaintiff's

evaporative

("swamp") cooler

for approxi-

mately two hours while he was on duty for Willow Creek Country
Club.
14.

From August, 1982 through December, 1982, plain-

tiff hired and employed Jeanette Wilhelm as a food service consultant.
plaintiff,

She worked irregular hours, at the sole direction of
and

provided

ideas

various aspects of defendant's

and

implementation

concerning

food service operations.

Her

compensation between August and December, 1982, was in the form

of checks from defendant's General Fund, signed by plaintiff on
behalf of defendant.

No Federal or State taxes or FICA monies

were withheld from her checks.
15.

In December, 1982, plaintiff signed two checks to

Bruce R. Hewitt, one in the amount of $46.65, and one in the
amount of $565.25.
these checks.

Taxes and FICA monies were withheld from

The Court finds by a preponderance of the evi-

dence that the $46.65 check was Mr. Hewitt's Christmas bonus,
and the $565.25 check, which was to compensate Ms. Wilhelm for
certain hours she had worked at Willow Creek Country Club, was
made payable to Mr. Hewitt at Jeanette Wilhelm's request.
16.

From April through August, 1982, plaintiff wrote

checks from the General Fund totalling approximately $1,900 to
Frank

Rotunno,

which

were

for

living

expenses

and

travel

expenses, and from which no taxes or FICA monies were withheld.

The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

plaintiff

obtained

authorization

for

the

payment

of

such

expenses to Mr. Rotunno, and in such manner, when he obtained
the approval of Willow Creek Country Club Board Member Jerry
Butterfield

to

retain

Mr.

Rotunno .on

the

same

basis

that

Rotunno was retained by plaintiff between November, 1981, and
January, 1982, at which time such living and travel expenses,
and the method of payment, were approved by Club Treasurer Jay

Berquist.

The Court also finds by a preponderance of the evi-

dence that plaintiff was paid
defendant

for

the

first

living and

several

months

travel expenses by
he

was

employed

by

defendant, and that no taxes or FICA were withheld from his
checks at that time.
17.

During

1982,

plaintiff

wrote

bonus

checks

to

Donna Hagblom in the amount of $300 and $419,85, and a bonus
check to Frank Rotunno in the amount of $300.

The Court finds

that the evidence presented at trial did not preponderate to
defendant's benefit that Ms. Hagblom was required by plaintiff
to return $150 of her

$300

bonus, and

$300 of her $419.85

bonus, in cash to plaintiff, nor did the evidence preponderate
to defendant's benefit that Mr. Rotunno was required by plaintiff to return $150 of his $300 bonus in cash to plaintiff.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pur-

suant to § 78-3-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended)*
2.

Venue

is

proper

in

this

Court

pursuant

to

§ 78-13-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
3.

None of plaintiff's actions as found above are

acts of gross negligence, unethical conduct, or moral turpitude.
4.

Plaintiff must reimburse defendant for the ser-

vices of its maintenance men, for a total of fourteen hours at

$5 per hour, plus $35 for transportation costs, or a total offset of $105.
5.
plaintiff,

Defendant breached
in

that

it

terminated

its Employment Agreement
plaintiff

without

with

cause

and

failed to pay plaintiff one-third (1/3) of his annual salary as
liquidated damages.
6.

Plaintiff

has

been

damaged

$13,800, plus interest at twelve percent

in

the

amount

of

(12%) per annum from

January 23, 1983, to the date of Judgment rendered herein.
7.
and

$3,500

Plaintiff
in

is entitled

attorneys'

fees,

to

$41.50

incurred

Employment Agreement.
DATED this

day of April, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

David B. Dee
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM
Biele, Haslam & Hatch

RoV G. Haslam
Attorneys for Defendant
4868G
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY AARTS,
Plaintiff,

;

A M E N D E D
J U D G M E N T

vs •

:

WILLOW CREEK COUNTRY CLUB,
a Utah corporation,

:
:
:
:

Defendant,

Civil No, C83-2383
(Judge David B. Dee)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before this Court, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding, on
March 20, 1985

at

10:00

a.m.

Plaintiff

was

represented

Jeffrey Oritt; defendant was represented by Roy G. Haslam.

by
The

Court, having read all pleadings and memoranda submitted by the
parties in support of their respective positions, having heard
testimony from witnesses for both sides, having heard argument
from counsel, having reviewed all documentary evidence, being
fully

advised

in the premises

herein, and

having

made

and

entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Under plaintiff's Cause of Action, plaintiff is

entitled to the sum of $13,800, together with interest at the

rate of twelve percent per annum from January 23, 1983, to the
date of Judgment herein,
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to the costs of this action

in the amount of $41.50 and attorneys* fees in the amount of
$3,500, as set forth

in plaintiff's Affidavit

of Attorneys'

Fees and Costs.
3.

Defendant

is

entitled

to

an

against the above Judgment.
DATED this

day of April, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

D5tfid"B. Dee
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM
i J , i • -. ...

M X :

Biele, Haslam & Hatch

Roy AG J hasiam
Attorney for Defendant

offset

of

$105

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
The
FINDINGS

OF

foregoing
FACT

AND

AMENDED
CONCLUSIONS

JUDGMENT
OF

LAW

and

accompanying

were

prepared

by

Jeffrey Oritt, counsel for the plaintiff, and hand-delivered to
Roy G. Haslam, counsel for the defendant, on this 2nd day of
April, 1985.
~

4841G
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